

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01
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PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05
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P R 021804Z JUN 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2169
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0276

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 2 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 138TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON JUNE 2
CHAired BY GDR REP (OESER), CZECHOSLOVAK REP (MEISNER) DELIVERED
THE ONLY STATEMENT. IN IT, MEISNER ATTACHED THE WESTERN POSITION
ON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, ARGUED FOR THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH,
CALLED FOR THE TABLING OF DATA ON NATIONAL FORCES, AND
VIGOROUSLY PRESSED THE EAST'S INTERIM FREEZE PROPOSAL. MEISNER
CLAIMED THAT A MAIN PROBLEM IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT THE
EAST'S RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME OF MANPOWER PARITY BUT
THE WEST'S INSISTENCE ON ITS INCORRECT ESTIMATE OF WARSAW PACT
FORCES. HE ATTACKED RECENT NATO APPEALS FOR AN INCREASED WESTERN
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DEFENSE EFFORT. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATEMENT,
THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1. THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE STRIVING TO FIND A COMMON
DENOMINATOR FOR UNDERSTANDING THE EXISTING MILITARY SITUATION
AND FOR AGREEING ON A METHOD OF REDUCTION IN ORDER TO REINFORCE
STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. BASED BOTH ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE ALL TYPES OF FORCES BY UNITS ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS.

3. WESTERN ARGUMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS BASED ON NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEM AND NATO'S REQUIREMENT THAT SOME PARTICIPANTS MUST BE ALLOWED TO MAKE UP THE SHORTFALLS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS DO NOT NOTE THE FACT THAT THESE SAME CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO THE WARSAW PACT.

4. NONETHELESS, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS DO NOT ACCEPT COLLECTIVITY. THESE VIENNA TALKS ARE NOT BLOC-TO-BLOC NEGOTIATIONS BUT TALKS IN WHICH ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

5. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CANNOT ACCEPT A NATIONAL SUB-CEILING ON SOVIET FORCES IF INDIVIDUAL WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. IN RESPONSE TO A WESTERN ARGUMENT, MEISNER SAID THAT SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA COULD NOT BE INCREASED UNDER NATIONAL CEILINGS.

7. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS STEMS FROM THE REAL MILITARY SITUATION IN THE AREA WHICH, DESPITE WESTERN CLAIMS OF SIGNIFICANT DISPARITIES, IS CHARACTERIZED BY AN
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APPROXIMATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES.

8. THE EAST WANTS APPROXIMATE EQUALITY BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES; THUS, IT IS NOT PARITY AS SUCH WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF EAST-WEST DISAGREEMENT BUT THE WEST'S INFLATED ESTIMATE OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER AND ITS REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE

RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES HAS BEEN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL FOR SOME TIME.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0276

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

9. DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY, THE WEST
CONTINUES TO ARGUE FOR ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS AND REFUSES TO
ACCEPT EASTERN MANPOWER FIGURES WHILE OFFERING NO PROOF THAT
THOSE FIGURES ARE WRONG.

10. MOREOVER, THE WEST REFUSES TO TABLE NATIONAL MANPOWER
FIGURES ON THE FORCES IN THE AREA OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT
IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE SOURCES OF THE CURRENT DATA DISAGREEMENT.

11. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE CONCERNED BY RECENT NATO APPEALS
FOR INCREASED MILITARY BUDGETS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF NATO
FORCES.

12. SUCH PRONOUNCEMENTS CALL WESTERN GOOD WILL IN THESE
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NEGOTIATIONS INTO QUESTION AND RISK OPENING THE WAY TO A NEW
STAGE IN THE ARMS RACE.

13. SINCE MILITARY POTENTIAL CONSISTS OF AN OVERALL COMPLEX OF
MILITARY CAPABILITIES, ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
SHOULD BE REDUCED EQUIVALENTLY.

14. SINCE THERE ALREADY IS APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF FORCES IN
THE AREA, INCLUDING APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN MANPOWER AS SHOWN

BY OFFICIAL DATA, THERE WOULD BE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN
MAINTAINING THE PRESENT CORRELATION OF FORCES AND REDUCING
ONLY GROUND FORCES. AIR FORCE MANPOWER MUST ALSO BE REDUCED.

15. THAT THERE SEEMS LITTLE HOPE THE DATA EXAMINATION WILL BE
FAVORABLY CONCLUDED SOON IS ALL THE MORE REASON TO ADOPT THE
PARTIAL MEASURE PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR AN AGREEMENT NOT
TO INCREASE MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA DURING THE COURSE OF
THE TALKS.

16. THE WESTERN MANPOWER FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE
ACCEPTANCE OF THE OVERALL WESTERN POSITION, WHILE THAT OF THE
EAST WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF
INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS.

17. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, WHICH TAKES WESTERN VIEWS INTO
ACCOUNT BY BEING CONFINED TO A FREEZE ON MANPOWER, WOULD
CONSTITUTE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE TOWARD MOVING AWAY FROM THE
ARMS RACE TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

18. WITH THE TABLING OF OFFICIAL DATA, A NEW SITUATION FOR SUCH
A FREEZE EXISTS IN WHICH THE WEST COULD BE CERTAIN THAT THE
EAST WOULD NOT INCREASE ITS FORCES BEYOND THE STATED LEVEL.

19. THOROUGH STUDY SHOULD CONVINCE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT THE
BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT WAS PROVIDED BY THE EASTERN COMPROMISE
PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1976.RESOR
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